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China and the EU agreed in principle on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on December 
30, 2020, after 35 rounds of negotiations since 2014. In the EU (and the US), critical voices pointed at the 
uncertain enforceability of key provisions and the negative impact on cooperation between the EU and 
such key partners as the US vis-à-vis China. For China, the CAI is held as a diplomatic success. In fact, 
the recently published draft text suggests that the CAI is less comprehensive than the title indicates, and 
that important elements remain unresolved.  
 
As Europe is already open to Chinese investors, additional market opening is expected from China. EU 
efforts mostly focused on issues of limited market access, technology transfer and the regulatory 
environment. The CAI addresses these issues in the sections on investment liberalization and regulatory 
frameworks. China commits to opening its markets in some sectors, including electric vehicles and 
financial and air-transport services. However, one could ask whether China is not already unilaterally 
opening up these sectors, and the CAI just locks-in those reforms.1 Arguably, however, preventing the 
revocation of economic reforms in China is an important achievement in and by itself. Conversely, given 
Europe’s increasing scrutiny of Chinese investments, securing a high level of market access in Europe 
was high on the China’s agenda: while the EU does not make any substantial additional market access 
commitments to China, it guarantees the existing level of access. Securing market access and locking-in 
reforms may be important outcomes, but they are unlikely to substantially increase two-way investment 
flows.   
 
Potentially more important is the prohibition of forced technology transfer and joint venture requirements, 
which appear more comprehensive than what China agreed to in its WTO accession protocol or in the Phase 
One Deal with the US. In addition to technology transfer requirements imposed by the state, China and the 
EU also commit not to “directly or indirectly require, force, pressure or otherwise interfere with the transfer 
or licensing of technology between natural persons and enterprises”.2 Furthermore, the CAI includes a 
number of “level-playing-field” provisions that may improve the transparency of subsidies, enhance 
procedural transparency, predictability and fairness of regulatory and administrative procedures, and 
regulate the operations of state-owned enterprises.  
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The section on sustainable development is an important outcome of the CAI negotiations. While sustainable 
development sections are common in EU’s trade agreements, the CAI is China’s first agreement with such 
a section. As the CAI offers the EU much less leverage compared to a fully-fledged free trade agreement 
(FTA), the inclusion of such a comprehensive chapter section is a success. But the obligations under this 
section are mainly based on the parties’ existing commitments under other international environmental and 
labor treaties. Moreover, the wording of several key provisions (providing that the parties “shall strive to 
ensure” or “shall make continued and sustained efforts”) characterize such obligations as “best-effort” in 
nature.3 However, the section on sustainable development establishes a standalone mechanism to resolve 
disputes, similar to that included in the EU-Republic of Korea FTA. Under the latter mechanism, an 
independent panel has recently issued a decision holding that Korea (i) has violated its commitment to 
comply with the principle of freedom of association and (ii) should make “continued and sustained efforts 
towards ratification” of the “key ILO conventions”. Whether violations of the sustainable development 
section provisions under the CAI can lead to the same outcome remains to be seen, in particular as some of 
the key labor provisions are less binding in nature. In addition to regular government-to-government 
consultations, the CAI also requires the parties to hold dialogues with civil-society organizations, which 
could be challenging as Chinese law has strict limits on such organizations. This section may thus prove 
crucial for the ratification in the EU. If ratified, its practical effects would depend largely on good will, close 
cooperation and the usage of dialogue mechanisms.   
 
Lastly, the CAI does not include sections on investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS). The EU’s insistence to replace ISDS with an Investment Court System, as well as the ongoing 
multilateral discussions on a reform of ISDS, could explain this omission. While the parties will continue 
negotiating the sections on investment protection and ISDS and “endeavour” to conclude them within two 
years after the signature of the CAI, the 25 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with outdated ISDS rules 
between EU members and China remain in force and could possibly lead to unwanted ISDS claims.  
 
The CAI is stuck half-way in the development of China-EU bilateral investment relations. While it addresses 
important issues of market access, regulatory cooperation and sustainable development, it does not replace 
the old BITs, nor contribute to the overall reform of the international investment regime. Both parties should 
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